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Abstract
This paper investigates how business cycle volatility aﬀects internal and external
funding sources of banks. It argues that excessive credit growth, credit cycles, and
bank failures are phenomena related to distinct patterns of banks’ ﬁnancing options
over the cycle. This perspective reconciles rational behavior with some implications
of Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
There is a close link between business cycles, bank credit, and banking crises. According
to Jorda` at al. (2011), production growth, investment spending and credit growth over the
last 140 years were the smaller the more credit-intense the preceding boom had been. In
addition, ﬁnancial crises were often accompanied by deep and lasting recessions.
A possible explanation follows the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis of Minsky (1986),
according to which a period of prolonged prosperity may induce speculative euphoria and
excess borrowing which push the economy on the brink. This view became popular during
the recent world ﬁnancial crisis and challenged the consensus macroeconomic models based
on rational behavior of agents (Davidson, 2008). In response, ﬁnancial frictions became more
central in these models (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). However, they still have diﬃculties in
explaining excessive credit growth or discontinuous phenomena such as bank failures.
We present a model that focuses on the role of real volatility as a potential cause for the
dynamics and stability of credit supply. The model reconciles rational behavior with some
implications of the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis. We argue that bank stability and the
dynamics of credit are related to banks’ internal and external funding problems, for which
an important driver is the business cycle. In a downturn, internal funding sources dry up as
existing loans generate only small cash ﬂows and may even cause a debt overhang. External
funding is hampered as the funding liquidity of new loans is low in a weak environment with
a risky outlook. Bank stability and credit growth then depend on the relative importance
of these eﬀects. In a downturn with a gloomy outlook, banks cannot fully reﬁnance credit
by borrowing against their future earnings. To prevent such liquidity shortages, banks may
fuel excessive credit growth in good times to improve internal funding in later bad times.
However, if internal funding in downturns is insensitive to previous credit expansion, banks
will instead gamble for resurrection implying a failure should the recovery hold oﬀ. Finally,
if loans become too toxic in a downturn, banks will fail outright.
2 Set up
Consider a bank that lives for three dates. At t = 0 and t = 1 it raises funds from depositors,
invests at in a risk-free asset with zero net return, and grants loans lt. At t = 1, the economy
either is in benign conditions (“good” state g, probability p1) or experiences a downturn
(“bad” state b, probability 1 − p1). In the good state, loans granted at t = 0 earn a high
return vg and loans granted at t = 1 yield either rh,g (with probability p2,g) or rl,g < rh,g
at t = 2.1 If the bad state occurs at t = 1, early loans yield only vb < vg and late loans
yield rh,b < rl,g if the economy recovers (with probability p2,b) and rl,b < 1 otherwise. We
assume p1vg > 1 and p2,srh,s > 1. Given constant means μ1 := p1vg + (1− p1) vb and
μ2,s := p2,srh,s + (1− p2,s) rl,s, loan earnings read
vg = μ1 + (1− p1)Δ1, rh,s = μ2,s + (1− p2,s)Δ2,s, (1)
vb = μ1 − p1Δ1, rl,s = μ2,s − p2,sΔ2,s. (2)
with mean preserving spreads Δ1 := vg−vb and Δ2,s := rh,s−rl,s to measure risks associated
with lending at t = 0 and t = 1 respectively.2
1Unless otherwise indicated all returns are per unit.
2The returns thus exhibit persistent and mean reverting shocks, which is common in macromodels (cf.
Aghion et al., 2010).
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Originating loans is costly for the bank. Costs c(lt) are non-pecuniary, increasing and
convex with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. This captures the idea that loans diﬀer only in their complexity
and a bank adds the least complex loans ﬁrst to its portfolio. Depositors inelastically provide
funds to the bank at a zero interest rate. In return, the bank promises at t− 1 to repay at t
the face value of deposits dt. If it fails to keep the promise, a bank run completely destroys
all values. All agents are risk neutral and have no time preference.
3 Analysis
The bank can choose between three modes mt of operation at t = 0 and t = 1. In the safe
mode S, deposits are always repaid at the next date. The corresponding expected proﬁts
are φS0 (l0) = (μ1 − 1) l0 − c (l0) and φS1,s (l1,s) = (μ2,s − 1) l1,s − c (l1,s), respectively. In the
risky mode R, deposits are repaid only if earnings are large and the expected proﬁts are
only φR0 (l0) = (p1vg − 1) l0 − c (l0) and φR1,s (l1,s) = (p2,srh,s − 1) l1,s − c (l1,s). In the failure
mode F , the bank declares bankruptcy. Note that ﬁrst best loan volumes lfb0 and lfb1,s are
given by φS ′0
(
lfb0
)
= 0 and φS ′1,s
(
lfb1,s
)
= 0.
We proceed by backward induction. Let Ω1,s := vsl0 + a0 − d1 ≶ 0 be the cash ﬂow at
t = 1 in state s = g, b and q2,s the probability of a bank run at t = 2. Unless the bank
operates in the failure mode as from t = 1, its optimization problem reads
max
l1,s,a1,s,d2,s∈R+
π1,s =E [max {rj,sl1,s + a1,s − d2,s, 0}]− c (l1,s) (3)
s. t. l1,s + a1,s = Ω1,s + (1− q2,s) d2,s, (4)
q2,s =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if m1,s = S : d2,s ≤ rl,sl1,s + a1,s,
1− p2,s if m1,s = R : d2,s ∈ (rl,sl1,s + a1,s, rh,sl1,s + a1,s] ,
(5)
with j = h, l. The budget constraint (4) states that loans l1,s and assets a1,s are reﬁnanced
internally by the cash ﬂow Ω1,s and externally by fresh deposits of face value d2,s. According
to (5) a run occurs at t = 2 if the face value of deposits d2,s exceeds total earnings rj,sl1,s+a1,s.
Since all values are destroyed in a run, depositors invest (1− q2,s) d2,s at t = 1. If there is
no interior solution that yields a positive expected proﬁt for the bank, it will fail at t = 1.
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This decision problem is best understood when the comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of the safe and the risky mode are spelled out. The advantage of the safe mode at
t = 1 is that the bank collects all earnings irrespective of the economy’s state. The disad-
vantage is that lending is subject to a ﬁnancial restriction in the bad state. This restriction
results from the upper limit on the face value of deposits (d2,b ≤ rl,bl1,b + a1,b) which in
conjunction with (4) and (5) requires
Ω1,b + (rl,b − 1) l1,b ≥ 0. (6)
Since rl,b < 1, the bank cannot fully reﬁnance loans at t = 1 externally in the bad state.
Their funding liquidity is negative. Lending is then feasible only if the bank commands
additional internal funds, i.e. Ω1,b > 0. As these funds are limited, the loan volume l1,b is
bounded above by lmax1,b :=
Ω1,b
1−rl,b =
Ω1,b
p2,b(Δ2,b−˜Δ2,b)
with Δ˜2,b :=
μ2,b−1
p2,b
.3 The advantage of
the risky over the safe mode is that no upper limit on lending exists as depositors can be
promised up to rh,sl1,s+a1,s. Although the bank will keep this promise only with probability
p2,s, it suﬃces to reﬁnance any new loan since p2,srh,s > 1. The disadvantage is that with
probability 1− p2,s a run destroys all values. Lending is thus less proﬁtable.
Let π∗1,s denote the bank’s expected proﬁts at t = 1 given the optimal loans size l
∗
1,s and
mode of operation m∗1,s at this date in state s = g, b. As long as the bank does not fail at
t = 0, its decision problem reads
max
l0,a0,d1∈R+
π0 = p1π
∗
1,g + (1− p1) π∗1,b − c(l0) (7)
s. t. l0 + a0 = (1− q1) d1, (8)
q1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if m0 = S : m∗1,g = F and m∗1,b = F
1− p1 if m0 = R : m∗1,g = F and m∗1,b = F
, (9)
with q1 being the probability of a run at t = 1. A subgame-perfect strategy maximizes the
bank’s expected proﬁts π0 taking into account its future decisions, the budget constraint
(8), and the probability (9) with which it fails to repay the face value of deposits at t = 1.
3Such an upper bound is not an issue in the good state, in which the funding liquidity of loans is positive
as rl,g > 1.
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For a bank that opts for the safe mode at t = 0, internal and external funds are abun-
dantly available if the economy turns out to be in benign conditions at t = 1 as both, the re-
alized returns vg on old loans and the minimum returns rl,g on new loans are greater than the
opportunity costs of funds. If the economy slows down, the ﬁnancial position of the bank at
t = 1 crucially depends on how much it collects from the loans granted at t = 0 and how much
it owes to depositors. The budget constraint (8) implies Ω1,b = (vb − 1) l0 = p1(Δ˜1 −Δ1)l0
with Δ˜1 :=
μ1−1
p1
. Hence, the bank cannot proceed with the safe mode if Δ1 > Δ˜1 as it
then suﬀers from a debt overhang (Ω1,b < 0), which is the higher the more loans have been
granted at t = 0. If Δ1 < Δ˜1, internal funds ease the ﬁnancial constraint in a downturn
(Ω1,b > 0). Moreover, funds available for new loans are the greater, the more loans were
granted at t = 0. This follows from rewriting the upper limit on loans lmax1,b to
lmax1,b =
p1(˜Δ1−Δ1)
p2,b(Δ2,b−˜Δ2,b)
l0 =: ψl0 (10)
where ψ measures how many loans could be additionally reﬁnanced in a downturn if one
more unit was granted at t = 0; it is smaller for higher risks Δ1 or Δ2,b.
Against this background, the bank’s decision is ultimately a choice between ﬁve strategies
which can be put in a strict order. Strategy A is to always operate in the safe mode and
lend according to the ﬁrst best. This strategy is available as long as the upper limit on
loans at t = 1 in a downturn is not binding, lmax1,b ≥ lfb1,b, i.e. if risks are small or if lfb0 is large
relative to lfb1,b.
When the restriction lmax1,b binds, the next best alternative is strategy B, which is to
maintain the safe mode and to ease this restriction by increasing loans at t = 0 above the
ﬁrst best level in order to mitigate funding problems in a downturn at t = 1. The bank thus
deviates from the ﬁrst best in a way that one may interpret as excessive credit growth at
t = 0 turning into a credit crunch at t = 1. Note that higher risks not only imply a tighter
ﬁnancial constraint in a downturn by impairing internal funds and the funding liquidity of
new loans. They also imply a weaker impact of l0 on this constraint. Hence, the ineﬃciencies
associated with a deviation from the ﬁrst best in both periods become more of a burden for
higher risks.
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Above a certain risk level, the bank thus pursues strategy C which is to always grant
loans according to the ﬁrst best in good times and to switch to the risky mode in a downturn,
implying a bank run if the recovery from the downturn holds oﬀ. If risks associated with l0
are even larger, lending according to the ﬁrst best at t = 0 would already be associated with
a substantial debt overhang in a downturn. Anticipating that the bank would ﬁnd it optimal
to default on its debt in this situation, depositors are not willing to reﬁnance so many loans
at t = 0. Accordingly, strategy D is to signal credibility to depositors by not raising too
much debt at t = 0, implying that loans are bounded above by some lmax0 already at this
date. As for risks associated with l1,b, they do not come with such disincentives. Quite the
contrary, since a bank that already speculates on the upside can only beneﬁt from a further
wedge between the returns in the recovery and the non-recovery state, a larger recovery risk
allows the bank to cover a higher debt overhang without suﬀering from a loss of conﬁdence.
An observer could easily interpret this pattern as banks making little provisions for bad
times in the presence of signiﬁcant risks throughout the cycle and responding to emerging
ﬁnancial diﬃculties mainly by taking on a fragile capital structure.
Finally, for very large risks Δ1 attached to loans in the ﬁrst period, strategy E is adopted
which is to pursue the risky mode already at t = 0. Lending at t = 0 will be suppressed
as loan earnings can only be collected when the economy does not slip into a downturn.
This case may be representative for poor and least developed economies that experience
substantial diﬃculties in growing out of their ﬁnancial problems.
Formally, the bank’s optimal decisions m∗0, l
∗
0 at t = 0 and m
∗
1,b, l
∗
1,b in the downturn at
t = 1 satisfy4
m∗0 = S, l∗0 = lfb0 , m∗1,b = S, l∗1,b = lfb1,b if Δ1 ≤ ΔA
m∗0 = S, l∗0 = lS0 > lfb0 , m∗1,b = S, l∗1,b = ψlS0 < lfb1,b if Δ1 ∈ (ΔA, ΔB]
m∗0 = S, l∗0 = lfb0 , m∗1,b = R, l∗1,b = lR1,b < lfb1,b if Δ1 ∈ (ΔB, ΔC ]
m∗0 = S, l∗0 = lmax0 < lfb0 , m∗1,b = R, l∗1,b = lR1,b < lfb1,b if Δ1 ∈ (ΔC , ΔD]
m∗0 = R, l∗0 = lR0 < lfb0 , m∗1,b = F , l∗1,b = 0 if Δ1 > ΔD.
(11)
4In the good state at t = 1, the bank always chooses m∗1,g = S and l∗1,g = lfb1,g.
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with
ΔA := Δ˜1 − p2,b(Δ2,b−
˜Δ2,b)
p1
lfb1,b
lfb0
, ΔB : (1− p1)
[
φS1,b
(
ψlS0
)− φR1,b (lR1,b)] = φS0 (lfb0 )− φS0 (lS0 ) ,
ΔC := Δ˜1 +
φR1,b(lR1,b)
p1lfb0
, ΔD : (1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
= φR0
(
lR0
)− φS0
(
φR1,b(lR1,b)
p1(ΔD−˜Δ1)
)
,
lR0 : φ
R′
0
(
lR0
)
= 0, lS0 : (1− p1)ψφS ′1,b
(
ψlS0
)
+ φS ′0
(
lS0
)
= 0,
lR1,s : φ
R′
1,s
(
lR1,s
)
= 0, lmax0 :=
φR1,b(lR1,b)
p1(Δ1−˜Δ1) .
4 Concluding remarks
Our analysis abstracts from any repercussion from the banking sector to the business cycle.
Although there is little doubt on these eﬀects, turning them oﬀ not only sharpens the focus
on the role of real volatility as a potential cause for the dynamics and stability of credit
supply. It also conﬁrms conventional wisdom that macroeconomic policy has a role to
play for ﬁnancial stability. In our model the outcome is constrained Pareto eﬃcient. The
performance of banks is thus improved only if the real economy is stabilized, for which a
credible macro policy can make an important contribution.
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Appendix
We derive the optimal behavior of the bank in each period in three steps. First, we determine
its behavior and expected payoﬀ in the safe mode. Then, we proceed analogously for the
risky mode. As a last step, we derive the actual behavior of the bank by comparing the
respective payoﬀs with the payoﬀ of failure. We apply backward induction.
Second Period Optimum
Safe Mode
For m1,s = S, insertion of q2,s = 0 into (4) yields d2,s = l1,s + a1,s − Ω1,s. Insertion of this,
(1) and (2) into (3) and the restriction (5) on d2,s yields maxl1,s π1,s = φ
S
1,s (l1,s) + Ω1,s s. t.
p2,s
(
Δ2,s − Δ˜2,s
)
l1,s ≤ Ω1,s with Δ˜2,s := μ2,s−1p2,s . Note that π′1,s = φS ′1,s (l1,s) = 0 for l1,s = lfb1,s,
π′′1,s < 0 and recall from the main text that rl,g > 1 > rl,b, which implies Δ2,g < Δ˜2,g and
Δ2,b > Δ˜2,b. Deﬁning l
min
1,g := − Ω1,gp2,g(˜Δ2,g−Δ2,g) and l
max
1,b :=
Ω1,b
p2,b(Δ2,b−˜Δ2,b)
and denoting the
(partial) optimum by the superscript S∗, we obtain
lS∗1,g = max
{
lfb1,g, l
min
1,g
}
, πS∗1,g = φ
S
1,g
(
max
{
lfb1,g, l
min
1,g
})
+ Ω1,g, (A.1)
lS∗1,b = min
{
lfb1,b, l
max
1,b
}
, πS∗1,b = φ
S
1,b
(
min
{
lfb1,b, l
max
1,b
})
+ Ω1,b. (A.2)
Risky Mode
For m1,s = R, insertion of q2,s = 1− p2,s into (4) yields d2,s = l1,s+a1,s−Ω1,sp2,s . Insertion of this
into (3) yields maxl1,s,a1,s π1,s = φ
R
1,s (l1,s)− (1− p2,s) a1,s+Ω1,s. We ignore the restriction (5)
on d2,s for the moment but show below that it is met when the bank adopts the risky mode.
Since aR∗1,s = 0, we obtain maxl1,s π1,s = φ
R
1,s (l1,s) + Ω1,s. Note that π
′
1,s = φ
R′
1,s (l1,s) = 0 for
l1,s = l
R
1,s < l
fb
1,s where l
R
1,s : φ
R′
1,s
(
lR1,s
)
= 0 and π′′1,s < 0. We obtain
lR∗1,s = l
R
1,s, π
R∗
1,s = φ
R
1,s
(
lR1,s
)
+ Ω1,s. (A.3)
Optimal Behavior
We now compare πS∗1,s and π
R∗
1,s with the expected payoﬀ π
F∗
1,s = 0 of the failure mode.
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Good State If Ω1,g ≥ 0, then (A.1) and (A.3) imply πS∗1,g > πR∗1,g > πF∗1,g . We can conclude
m∗1,g = S, l∗1,g = lfb1,g, π∗1,g = φS1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ Ω1,g if Ω1,g ≥ 0. (A.4)
If Ω1,g < 0, then (A.1) and (A.3) imply π
S∗
1,g < φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
and πR∗1,g < φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
. We can
conclude
π∗1,g < φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
if Ω1,g < 0. (A.5)
Bad State If Ω1,b ≥ 0, then (A.2) and (A.3) imply lmax1,b ≥ 0, πS∗1,b ≥ 0 and πR∗1,b > 0. We
can conclude
m∗1,b = S, l∗1,b = lfb1,b, π∗1,b = φS1,b
(
lfb1,b
)
+ Ω1,b if l
max
1,b ≥ lfb1,b,
m∗1,b = S, l∗1,b = lmax1,b , π∗1,b = φS1,b
(
lmax1,b
)
+ Ω1,b if l
max
1,b ∈
[
0, lfb1,b
)
, φS1,b
(
lmax1,b
) ≥ φR1,b (lR1,b) ,
m∗1,b = R, l∗1,b = lR1,b, π∗1,b = φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ Ω1,b if l
max
1,b ∈
[
0, lfb1,b
)
, φS1,b
(
lmax1,b
)
< φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
.
(A.6)
If Ω1,b < 0, then (A.2) and (A.3) imply l
max
1,b < 0, π
S∗
1,b < 0 and π
R∗
1,b ≶ 0. We can conclude
m∗1,b = R, l∗1,b = lR1,b, π∗1,b = φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ Ω1,b if l
max
1,b < 0, Ω1,b ∈
[−φR1,b (lR1,b) , 0] ,
m∗1,b = F , l∗1,b = 0, π∗1,b = 0 if lmax1,b < 0, Ω1,b < −φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
.
(A.7)
Since m∗1,b = R only if lR1,b > lmax1,b and Ω1,b ≥ −φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
, the restriction (5) on d2,s will be
met.
First Period Optimum
Safe Mode
For m0 = S, insertion of q1 = 0 into (8) yields d1 = l0 + a0. Insertion of this, (1) and
(2) into Ω1,s := vsl0 + a0 − d1 for s = g, b yields Ω1,g = (μ1 + (1− p1)Δ1 − 1) l0 ≥ 0 and
Ω1,b = (μ1 − p1Δ1 − 1) l0 ≶ 0 so that (A.4) implies π∗1,g = φS1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ Ω1,g while (A.6) and
(A.7) imply π∗1,b = φ
m∗1,b
1,b
(
l∗1,b
)
+Ω1,b form
∗
1,b = F . Insertion of Ω1,g, Ω1,b, π∗1,g and π∗1,b into (7)
and the restriction (9) on m∗1,s yields maxl0 π0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φm
∗
1,b
1,b
(
l∗1,b
)
+ φS0 (l0)
2
s. t. l0 ≤ φ
R
1,b(lR1,b)
p1(Δ1−˜Δ1) =: l
max
0 if Δ1 > Δ˜1. This implies
π′0 = (1− p1)φ
m∗1,b ′
1,b
(
l∗1,b
) ∂l∗1,b
∂l0
+ φS ′0 (l0) . (A.8)
Note that lmax1,b as deﬁned in (A.2) can be redeﬁned to l
max
1,b := ψl0 with ψ :=
p1(˜Δ1−Δ1)
p2,b(Δ2,b−˜Δ2,b)
and consider the following two cases.
Case I Suppose that Δ1 ≤ Δ˜1 and thus ψ ≥ 0 and lmax1,b ≥ 0.
• Ifm∗1,b = R, then (A.6) implies
∂l∗1,b
∂l0
= 0. Insertion of this in (A.8) yields π′0 = φ
S ′
0 (l0) =
0 for l0 = l
fb
0 and π
′′
0 < 0. Denoting the (partial) optimum by the superscript SR∗, we
obtain
lSR∗0 = l
fb
0 , π
SR∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ φS0
(
lfb0
)
if ψ ≥ 0.
• If m∗1,b = S, then (A.6) implies
∂l∗1,b
∂l0
= ψ for ψl0 ∈
[
0, lfb1,b
)
and
∂l∗1,b
∂l0
= 0 for ψl0 ≥ lfb1,b.
Insertion of this in (A.8) yields π′0 = (1− p1)ψφS ′1,b (ψl0) + φS ′0 (l0) for ψl0 ∈
[
0, lfb1,b
)
and π′0 = φ
S ′
0 (l0) for ψl0 ≥ lfb1,b. This has two implications. (a) If ψlfb0 ≥ lfb1,b, then
π′0 = 0 for l0 = l
fb
0 and π
′′
0 < 0. (b) If ψl
fb
0 < l
fb
1,b, then π
′
0 = 0 for l0 = l
S
0 , where
lS0 : (1− p1)ψφS ′1,b
(
ψlS0
)
+ φS ′0
(
lS0
)
= 0 and π′′0 < 0. Accordingly, we have
lSS∗0 = l
fb
0 , π
SS∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φS1,b
(
lfb1,b
)
+ φS0
(
lfb0
)
if ψlfb0 ≥ lfb1,b,
lSS∗0 = l
S
0 , π
SS∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φS1,b
(
ψlS0
)
+ φS0
(
lS0
)
if ψlfb0 ∈
[
0, lfb1,b
)
.
Note that if ψlfb0 ≥ lfb1,b and thus Δ1 ≤ Δ˜1 −
p2,b(Δ2,b−˜Δ2,b)
p1
lfb1,b
lfb0
=: ΔA, then π
SS∗
0 > π
SR∗
0 .
Moreover, if ψlfb0 < l
fb
1,b and thus Δ1 > ΔA, then
∂ψ
∂Δ1
< 0 and
∂πSS∗0
∂ψ
> 0 so that πSS∗0 is
decreasing in Δ1 while π
SR∗
0 is independent of Δ1. Therefore, we have π
SS∗
0 ≥ πSR∗0 only if
Δ1 ≤ ΔB where ΔB is implicitly deﬁned by
(1− p1)
(
φS1,b
(
ψlS0
)− φR1,b (lR1,b)) = φS0 (lfb0 )− φS0 (lS0 ) . (A.9)
3
We can conclude
lS∗0 = l
fb
0 , π
S∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φS1,b
(
lfb1,b
)
+ φS0
(
lfb0
)
if Δ1 ≤ ΔA,
lS∗0 = l
S
0 , π
S∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φS1,b
(
ψlS0
)
+ φS0
(
lS0
)
if Δ1 ∈ (ΔA, ΔB] ,
lS∗0 = l
fb
0 , π
S∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ φS0
(
lfb0
)
if Δ1 ∈
(
ΔB, Δ˜1
]
.
(A.10)
Case II Suppose that Δ1 > Δ˜1 and thus l
max
1,b ≤ 0. Then, (A.7) implies
∂l∗1,b
∂l0
= 0. Insertion
of this in (A.8) yields π′0 = φ
S ′
0 (l0) = 0 for l0 = l
fb
0 and π
′′
0 < 0. Note that l
fb
0 ≤ lmax0 only if
Δ1 ≤ Δ˜1 + φ
R
1,b(lR1,b)
p1lfb0
=: ΔC . We obtain
lS∗0 = l
fb
0 , π
S∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ φS0
(
lfb0
)
if Δ1 ∈
(
Δ˜1, ΔC
]
,
lS∗0 = l
max
0 , π
S∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ (1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
+ φS0 (l
max
0 ) if Δ1 > ΔC .
(A.11)
Risky Mode
For m0 = R, insertion of q1 = 1 − p1 into (8) yields d1 = l0+a0p1 . Insertion of this into
Ω1,s := vsl0+ a0− d1 for s = g, b yields Ω1,g = p1vg−1p1 l0−
1−p1
p1
a0 and Ω1,b =
p1vb−1
p1
l0− 1−p1p1 a0.
Note that ∂Ω1,g
∂a0
< 0 and that (A.4) and (A.5) imply
∂π∗1,g
∂Ω1,g
> 0 while the restriction (9)
on m∗1,b and (A.7) requires π
∗
1,b = 0. In conjunction with (7), we obtain a
∗
0 = 0 and thus
Ω1,g =
p1vg−1
p1
l0 > 0 and Ω1,b =
p1vb−1
p1
l0 so that (A.4) implies π
∗
1,g = φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ Ω1,g.
Insertion of Ω1,g, π
∗
1,g and π
∗
1,b = 0 into (7) yields maxl0 π0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ φR0 (l0). Note
that π′0 = φ
R′
0 (l0) = 0 for l0 = l
R
0 < l
fb
0 where l
R
0 : φ
R′
0
(
lR0
)
= 0 and π′′0 < 0. We obtain
lR∗0 = l
R
0 , π
R∗
0 = p1φ
S
1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
+ φR0
(
lR0
)
. (A.12)
Optimal Behavior
We now compare πS∗0 and π
R∗
0 with the expected payoﬀ π
F∗
0 = 0 of the failure mode.
• If Δ1 ≤ ΔC , then (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12) imply πS∗0 > πR∗0 > 0.
• If Δ1 > ΔC , then (A.11) and (A.12) imply that πS∗0 is decreasing in Δ1 (since lmax0
is decreasing in Δ1) while π
R∗
0 > 0 is independent of Δ1. Therefore, we have π
S∗
0 ≥
4
πR∗0 > 0 only if Δ ≤ ΔD where ΔD is deﬁned by
(1− p1)φR1,b
(
lR1,b
)
= φR0
(
lR0
)− φS0
(
φR1,b(lR1,b)
p1(ΔD−˜Δ1)
)
. (A.13)
In conjunction with (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), these two cases immediately lead to (11).
5
